
Referenced Statements

Start Lester 1991

1. In both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, where rates of homicide and other indictable crimes increased over the period 1950 to 1990, rates of suicide increased as well, suggesting that both causes of death could be considered indicators of a more general societal disorder. 1
2. A 1992 paper used Identity Salience Theory to argue that “Whether they are Catholic or Protestant, people in Northern Ireland use the symbols of religious affiliation to form a major public identity”, and that “symbols of religious affiliation based on stable structural forces [sustain] the conflict” [p. 220]. From this theory they hypothesised firstly that levels of religious orthodoxy in Northern Ireland can be expected to be high, and secondly to be largely independent of other demographic attributes; they found strong empirical support of the first hypothesis, and fairly strong but more mixed evidence for the second hypothesis, with indications that religious orthodoxy reduces with education, employment and income.2
3. Both important parallels and difference between the religious sectarianism of Northern Ireland and racism have been noted, with both race and religious identity operating as visible social markers, and the colonial heritage of the island of Ireland leading to a concentration of industrial development, wealth and economic opportunity within Protestant regions in the North East of the island.3
4. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the main police force in Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), was drawn disproportionately from Protestant rather than Catholic populations, with evidence that Catholics working in the RUC faced cultural detachment from the broader Catholic community.4
5. Much of the resource from terrorist groups in Northern Ireland was drawn from the black economy, including activities such as fraud, extortion and racketeering.5
6. Additional terrorist legislation was developed throughout the Troubles to try to make it easier for those involved in terrorism to be prosecuted.6
7. Psychologists have long been interested in the conflict in Northern Ireland, investigating both the mental health impacts of the conflict on individuals, and the role of group identity and dynamics in sustaining conflict.7
8. Theories of conflict management include both resolution-based approaches, emphasising the development of shared understanding and relations between groups, and settlement-based approaches, emphasising negotiation and bargaining for resource between groups, though such approaches are not mutually exclusive.8
9. Paramilitary ceasefires in late 1994 were identified near the time as important developments in the peace process, and the best hope for resolution of the conflict for over twenty five years.9
10. An international survey on religious and political outlook in people in eight countries in the early 199s, including Northern Ireland, found evidence that non-religious people also tend to have less faith in political institutions.10
11. Not all religious people in Northern Ireland are Protestant or Catholic, and such ‘religious independents’ have been shown to have views on a wide range of social and political issues that are different from Protestants and Catholics.11
12. Paramilitary operations by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) officially ended on 31 August 1994; six weeks later, on 13 October 1994, a cessation of violence was announced by Loyalist forces, leading to a situation described in 1995 as a ‘cold peace’.12
13. At least one individual who served in armed forced in Northern Ireland during the Troubles has experienced post-traumatic stress disorder from a terrorist attack he did not experience directly, but believed he did.13
14. The Catholic share of Northern Ireland’s population has been steadily rising throughout the 1970s and 1980s.12
15. A studiously collected record of deaths due to the conflict, published in 1994, suggests that in most years Republicans were responsible for more killings than any other military or paramilitary faction, peaking at over 250 deaths in 1972, before levelling off to around 50 killings per year throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. Loyalist killings rose to over 100 in the mid 1970s, before falling to around 10 killings per year in the 1980s, then rising again in the early 1990s.14
16. As religion became less of a defensive social identity, so there may have been more willingness amongst Catholics to address injustices committed within the Catholic church, such as the sexual abuse of children.15
17. Loyalist terrorism has been labelled ‘pro-state’ terrorism, in which perpetrators act believing they are carrying out the state’s duties in eliminating security threats.16 The boundary between such forms of terrorism and vigilantism is thus porous.
18. A resumption of IRA violence occurred on 9 February 1996, marked by the bombing of Canary Wharf in London.17
19. A review of completed suicides over one year in Northern Ireland found the majority (86%) had previously presented with clinical syndromes, and that males who completed suicide tended to have longer periods of contact with health care professionals than females.18
20. Suicide rates in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland tended to be less than half those in England & Wales and Scotland in the 1960s, more than doubling during the 1970s and 1980s, but not to levels greatly above those in England & Wales, and remaining somewhat below those in Scotland.19
21. Interviews with 117 14-15 year olds in Northern Ireland showed attitudes to the inevitability of conflict fell sharply after the 1994 ceasefire announcements.20
22. It has been argued that the role of the IRA in tit-for-tat sectarianism is overstated, and that instead they should be considered a guerrilla army engaged in a strategic military campaign.21
23. The role of the RUC as the sole agents of social control and managing crime was contested in many parts of Northern Ireland, leading to the growth of informal or ‘popular’ forms of crime management and social control instead; it has been argued that political violence from groups engaged in such activities may have had a positive effect on crime management.22
24. Analysis of attitudes of over 200 students in Northern Ireland in the late 1990s found national and religious identities not to be salient in how students saw themselves.23
25. Practice and attitudes within either Northern Irish Protestantism and Catholicism are not monolithic, and so differences within either group can be overstated.24
26. Sporting activity may be one means by which separate Protestant and Catholic identities can be sublimated under a shared ‘Northern Irish’ identity.25
27. Conflict and contestation over space is not confined in Northern Ireland to urban areas, and is also observed in rural communities and vilalges.26
28. Concerns about physical or professional reprisals to unwelcome reporting may have led journalists based in or covering Northern Ireland to be selective in what they report about the conflict. 27
29. Using the term ‘paramilitary’ to refer to the IRA may underplay the close links between the organisation’s military and civil activites.28
30. A total of 3598 deaths were attributed killings in the conflict between 1969 and 1998. A breakdown of these deaths by age group indicates one quarter of these deaths occurred in people aged 18-23, with attributed killings then falling with age.29 Unlike many conventional wars, however, children aged 12-17 also died in large numbers.29
31. It has been argued that, whereas ethno-national conflict since the establishment of Northern Ireland in 1921 sharpened the border with the Republic of Ireland, the European Single Market made it more permeable, highlighting the influence that global factors can have on the region.30
32. It may be that Northern Ireland has not been analysed as rigorously as a case study of conflict as other civil wars in perhaps less affluent regions.31
33. Catholics in Northern Ireland had disadvantaged class positions relative to Protestants for much of the period 1922 to 1972, but these inequalities had sharply reduced by 1996. 32
34. There are complex relationships between national and religious identity, with Polish national identity long considered synonymous with Catholic religious identity, for example, while in Northern Ireland a Catholic religious identity is more likely to confer a pan-Irish rather than Northern Irish national identity.33 Catholicism may therefore operate more as a distinct and different ‘cultural religion’ linked to different secular identities in Northern Ireland than Poland,33 and so any headline statistics comparing the Catholic population of Northern Ireland over time may need to consider Northern Irish Catholics and other European Catholics as distinct populations with different implications for further conflict in Northern Ireland.
35. The apparent stability of peace in Northern Ireland since the Good Friday Agreement has allowed for a greater focus on economic regeneration in Belfast.34
36. In the conflict in Northern Ireland, the distinction between ‘combatants’ and ‘non-combatants’ was often fuzzy, meaning incidental or intentional targeting of non-combatants by either side may have been commonplace.35
37. In Northern Ireland Catholic and Protestant religious identities are so entwined with broader cultural and political identities that no long-term solution to political problems can neglect the issue of religion.36
38. The Provisional IRA has been considered in depth a case study in power, in the various ways terrorist groups must develop and manage multiple forms of power and authority – including physical power, resource power, position power – to resource and sustain a campaign of violence for many decades, and in the tactics and considerations given to these issues within the Green Book, a key IRA training manual.37
39. The European Commission invested over £80 million into district partnerships in Northern Ireland, through its Peace and Reconciliation Special Support Programme by the end of 1999.38
40. Qualitative research investigating the opinions of key stakeholders on both sides of the sectarian divide in Northern Ireland pointed out that simply investing large amounts of money into the region through the Peace and Reconciliation Special Support Programme does not necessarily lead to a reduction in sectarian conflict; indeed attempts to access such new resource could create a new opportunity for the escalation rather than the diffusion of such conflicts.39
41. It has been argued that British policy towards Northern Ireland did not change substantially from 1972, even with large changes in the head of government and the dominant party in Westminster. 40
42. The relative influence of key individual leaders in the face of long-standing communal animosity and other structural factors, and the interactions between local actors and international actors in the conflict, has been considered in some detail. 41
43. Loyal Order Protestant parades in Northern Ireland have been used as a case study in how one group’s shared identities, world-views, contested claims and grievances towards another group can be repeated and reinforced through collective displays termed ‘psychocultural dramas.’42
44. Direct experience of terrorist incidents can have lasting psychological effects, including PTSD.43
45. It has been argued that there were enough exceptional factors behind the Good Friday Arrangement that it is unlikely to be an effective and transferrable blueprint for constitutional conflict resolution elsewhere; amongst other factors listed was the fact that demographic change had meant that Protestants had become only a small rather than overwhelming majority of the population. 44
46. Analysis of deaths through civil unrest and suicide in Northern Ireland between 1965 and 1997 concluded that the two causes were negative correlated over the period.45
47. Social psychologists have constructed a multi-factor model of Northern Irish social identity, and found Catholics expressed greater stability and identification with their group identity than did Protestants. 46
48. Sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland has implications for effective communication in the workplace, creating the need for employers to adopt effective communication strategies to appropriately address an additional layer of contentious issues.47
49. The distinction between (intergroup) ‘bridging’ and (intragroup) ‘bonding’ forms of social capital proposed by Robert Putnam has been considered in the context of Northern Ireland, and the argument made that sectarian conflict may have increased ‘bonding’ capital within either group at the expense of ‘bridging’ capital between the groups. 48
50. Developing friendships with members of the other group in Northern Ireland has been shown to reduce anxiety about encounters with outgroup members and prejudice towards them, in both samples of university students and the general population. 49
51. Ethno-religious conflict in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Israel/Palestine were long considered similar in their apparent intractability, but have been considered resolved in South Africa and at least largely stabilised in Northern Ireland.50
52. Mutual recognition and respect for the two cultures in Northern Ireland has been a focus of the Northern Irish Community Relations Council.51
53. A social psychological quantitative content analysis of events and speeches by leaders of unionist and nationalist factions in Northern Ireland found that the rhetoric employed by leaders on one side of the sectarian divide, in terms of both how their own side is represented (in-group inclusiveness) and the out-group is represented (out-group inclusiveness), appeared to affect group behaviours including intra-group cohesiveness, and inter-group conflict and cooperation.52
54. Social identity theory posits that group members aim to positively differentiate their own group from relevant out-groups to achieve a sense of positive identity.53
55. Analyses of levels of ingroup affect and outgroup affect in 2000 and 2001 found both Catholics and Protestants expressed higher affect for their ingroup than for the outgroup, and that differences between outgroup and ingroup affect were somewhat greater for Protestants than for Catholics.54
56. It has been suggested that the EU can affect border conflict through four mechanisms: compulsory impact, in which borders have to be removed or reduced to meet EU treaty obligations; enabling impact, in which actors in specific parties to the dispute link their political agendas to the EU; connective impact, in which the opportunities and challenges posed by greater EU membership are recognised as requiring cross-party collaboration; and constructive impact, in which the group identities of antagonistic parties become re-written under a broader European identity.55
57. Analysis of data from 1989 and 1991 found that contact between groups in Northern Ireland was associated with more positive attitudes to denominational mixing, intergroup forgiveness, perspective taking and trust.56
58. Qualitative interviews with teenagers in working class Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland found that many of the stories individuals on both sides told about the other were not based on first hand experience of contacts, but were second hand or ‘collective’ (unattributable) narratives about the other group.57
59. It may be attempts to gather ‘truths’ from victims on both sides of the conflict may not be completely compatible with reconciliation between the two groups, given the validity of such truth-making claims may not be universally agreed upon.58
60. One reason attributed to the success of the Good Friday Agreements is the inclusion of ‘militant nationalists’, the extreme ends of the political continuum, who if excluded could have acted to spoil the negotiations; 59 another reason was the use of external and neutral actors or agencies to the negotiations. 59,60
61. Amongst individuals involved in paramilitary activities, there are indications that even attempts to set up ‘truth commissions’ to collect accounts of activity may be considered a partisan political act, particularly amongst loyalists who do not consider their actions akin to those of republican paramilitaries. 61
62. Sectarianism has been described as an empty discourse of signs with real and measurable social and geographical consequences.62
63. The Northern Ireland conflicts involved multiple interacting elements, and it has been argued these elements should be modelled as a complex social ecology or system, incorporating positive and negative feedback between elements, rather than as a simple regression, in order to appropriately model the kind of ‘lock-in’ in rates of violence which emerge after initiating events.63 Events and actions which have been included in a complex ‘systemogram’ modelling deaths through violence in Northern Ireland include the searching of vehicles and houses, deaths of civilians, the use of CS gas, the internment of republicans, the deaths of military personnel, and the number of bombs exploded in a given month, each of which is measureable and can be seen to have an influence on the likelihood of over events in later time periods.63
64. Catholic and Protestant children the educational system is segregated, with Catholics and Protestants often taught in separate schools. According to the contact hypothesis, if people from opposing groups are brought into contact with each other under certain optimal conditions then conflict between groups can be reduced.64 The four proposed conditions for effective contact include: that members of both groups are treated with equal status; that situations should necessitate cooperation between members of the different groups; that opportunities for competition between groups be minimised; and that the situation of contact should be perceived as legitimate through institutional support. Integrated schools therefore provide great potential for reducing group conflict through effective and supervised contact, so long as effective solutions for avoiding situations of intergroup conflict are found.65
65. The importance of voluntary organisations, in particular women’s organisations, for reducing sectarian animosity should be recognised along with state-led initiatives.66
66. The city of Belfast is not just interpreted along sectarian lines, and the importance of identifying and promoting ‘disruptive’ narratives of the city for moving to a non-sectarian future has been recognised.67
67. Sectarian parades passing through contested streets can be nucleation sites for violent conflict. The Protestant Apprentice Boys of Derry, for instance, parade twice yearly through a route that includes some Catholic neighbourhoods. It has been argued that these parades exist to claim symbolic victory over Catholics and their territory, and that such symbolic claims are the raison d’etre of the organisation.68
68. PTSD caused by terrorism and civil conflict in Northern Ireland can require early intervention with weeks of cognitive therapy to treat effectively.69
69. The historical overtones of sectarian conflict mean that historians’ accounts of the past can be deeply contested.70
70. The role of parents and family, and broader socialisation processes, in establishing national identity in young people near the Northern Irish border has been explored through textual analysis of essays written by young people on the subject; national and religious identity were believed to overlap strongly, and religion was recognised both to have the potential for promote tolerance as well as fuel hostilities.71,72
71. Despite the conflicts, rates of psychiatric morbidity, assessed using the GHQ-12 instrument in the British Household Panel Survey, are similar in Northern Ireland to other parts of the UK, and somewhat lower than in Wales.73 Region accounted for less than 1% of variation in GHQ-12 scores.73
72. An outcome of the Northern Ireland peace process may have been to reduce earlier trends towards integrated education, in order for the agreement to be mutually acceptable by both nationalists and unionists.74
73. Within schools pupils often self-segregate by gender, potentially meaning masculine sectarian identities can develop differently to feminine sectarian identities.75
74. Anger and a sense of dehumanisation towards another group can reduce intergroup forgiveness, and intergroup contact is considered important for reducing both attributes.76
75. It has been suggested that the European Commission’s approach to conflict resolution in Northern Ireland altered from the late 1980s due both to greater analytical understanding, and changes to the situation in Northern Ireland resulting from successful British and Irish negotiations.77 The EU may also have been encouraged to take a more pro-active role in the region due to a perceived failure at ethnic conflict mitigation in the Balkans in the early 1990s.77
76. Lack of contact between groups can be self-sustaining, as a precondition for increased intergroup contact may be reduced intergroup anxiety; anxiety and lack of contact can therefore be mutually reinforcing, and poor quality contact may further increase anxiety, as well as relative intergroup status – meeting on equal terms – which can further increase intergroup anxiety and reduce positive contact.78
77. The perception of threat posed by the other group, as well as anxiety towards that group, predicted the quality and quantity of intergroup contacts in two studies of group relations in Northern Ireland.79
78. A series of errors in the British Army’s deployment to Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1972 have been identified as important in making the situation much worse, and turning the initially envisaged task of ‘peace support’ into one of fighting an insurgency.80
79. The post-War background to the Northern Ireland conflict has been summarised as follows: in the late 1960s a Catholic protest movement emerged, inspired by the civil rights’ movement in the United States, prompting an often violent Protestant counter-movement opposed to Catholic marches, leading to widespread clashes between sides. By 1969 such clashes could not be controlled by the police forces in Belfast and Londonderry (numbering around three thousand full time officers and ten thousand reservists), and around 2,500 troops from the British Army were mobilised. Though the forces were somewhat successful at containing violence by keeping the sides separate, large amounts of Catholic property – including homes – were still damaged, and little guidance was provided about how the Army should operate, and strategies and tactics developed for the containment of insurgencies in British colonies, such as Malaya in the 1950s, may have been applied. In 1969 and 1970, the Army was considered relatively effective in protecting Catholics from Protestant attacks, and restrained in its response to violence, and so resistance to the Army from the IRA remained limited, as were IRA reprisal attacks on Protestants. The IRA was conflicted in its response to both the Army presence and Protestant reprisals, however, and in 1969 split into the less-militant Official IRA (OIRA), and the more militant Provisional IRA (PIRA). The Army, the OIRA and the PIRA then each competed to win favour and appear legitimate from the perspective of Catholic communities, with the PIRA to some extent hoping and goading the Army into behaviours which would de-legitimise the Army’s presence in these communities, in particular through their handling of sectarian tensions during marches. Examples of subsequent Army mis-steps included: the deployment of the Protestant-sympathising Scots Guards in 1970; and deploying too few troops for peaceful containment (‘minimal force’) strategies to be effective. This lack of numbers possibly led to excessive use of CS gas in riots which lasted for many days in Ballymurphy, the creation of Army ‘no go’ areas and so a power vacuum which the PIRA was able to fill, and being unable to properly defend the Catholic Short Strand enclave against Protestants in June 1970. Army attempts to disarm Catholic communities, combined with a lack of success defending them on all occasions, further acted to delegitimise the Army amongst affected Catholic communities. With reduced support for the Army in Catholic communities, the PIRA then began attacking the Army in 1971; worsening Army-PIRA relations led the Army to publicly name IRA leaders on 5 February 1971, swiftly followed by the first killing of a British soldier by the IRA the following day. Internment, i.e. indefinite detention without trial of suspected Republican paramilitaries, then swiftly followed, and on a large scale; on 9 August 1971, 342 people were arrested (of which only 55 were PIRA members), leading to protests over the following days in which 23 people died, including a Catholic priest. Army troop numbers increased by around a quarter within the year, reaching nearly 16,000 by October, and PIRA bombings and killings intensified. The effect of internment was to bring an end to Army-IRA relations in 1971; amity was then further increased through the deployment and actions of the Parachute Regiment (‘the Paras’), who were more inclined to use deadly force than existing forces. It was the Paras who faced a 7,000-strong Catholic civil rights march on 13 January 1972, ‘Bloody Sunday’, and shot dead 14 people later found to be unarmed, further delegitimising the Army and legitimising PIRA within many Catholic communities. This event, more than any other, can be seen to have ignited the decades of sectarian conflict that followed.81
80. The power sharing arrangement following the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) has been described as an example of ‘consociationalism’, a system of government in which coalition by both Republicans and Loyalists is mandated; this arrangement was for many years abided to by both sides to avoid either ‘direct rule’ from London (unacceptable to Republicans) or ‘joint sovereignty’ with the Republic of Ireland (unacceptable to Loyalists).82 Questions have therefore been raised about whether the GFA represents or helps to bring about conflict *resolution*, or is simply conflict *management* (or more pessimistically conflict deferment).82
81. It has been argued that an effective understanding of the conflict in Northern Ireland needs more than just a knowledge of facts, but also a willingness to try to see the conflict from the perspective of different groups through role-playing exercises.83
82. EU Peace Programmes for Northern Ireland and the Border Counties began in 1995 with the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace I) which provided €500 million in structural funds to the region, supplemented with an additional €167 from government; followed by the Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace II), which provided €531million via the EU and an additional €304 from national governments between 2000 and 2004.84 Most of this money was spent on projects focused on economic renewal and local regeneration rather than those explicitly addressing social integration, though it is argued the former aims facilitate the latter, with the Community Relations Council arguing that on the Irish border violence promotes poverty and poverty promotes violence.84 Such programmes were considered distinct from national government-led peace promotion efforts in their involvement of grass-roots community organisations in bidding for grants and implementation of initiatives.84
83. A paper describing an agent-based model of processes and dynamics of civil war emphasises the punctuated equilibria – sudden increases in violence punctuating longer periods of relative calm – can be expected in such complex systems, and that it is important to consider the ways that agents involved in war adapt over time in their attitudes and behaviour.85
84. It has been noted that the Northern Ireland conflict, being between two ‘white Christian’ ethno-religious groups, undermines the grand narrative provided by Huntington in the Clast of Civilizations.86
85. An economic resurgence followed the GFA, with important implications for migration, with the region changing from experiencing net out-migration to net in-migration, drawing migrants – as with much of the UK – from predominantly former Eastern bloc countries.87,88 Increased exposure to a greater diversity of ethnicities and cultural backgrounds led to an increased focus on acts of racism and anti-racism in the region. It has been argued that even statements of anti-racism, such as those presented on public murals, still employ sectarian narratives.87
86. It is argued that the Northern Ireland Peace Process was largely a top-down initiative, focused on engagement with key political figures and organisations rather than local communities.89
87. Infrastructure which emerged during the conflict – such as military installations and sectarian street murals - are now being promoted as tourist attractions.90 The conflict is estimated to have cost nearly 3,700 lives.90
88. Catholics have higher mortality rates than non-Catholics in Northern Ireland, but such differences appear to be explained by differences in socioeconomic status.91 Differences in behaviour and lifestyle associated with different religious denominations in Northern Ireland mean religious identity is predictive of differences in population health.91
89. Statistical analysis of intergroup contact theory finds that increased knowledge about out-groups is less effective in encouraging contact between groups than inter-group empathy and perspective taking.92
90. Compared with people living in segregated neighbourhoods, people living in mixed neighbourhoods in Northern Ireland tend to have lower ingroup bias and have lower tendency to take offensive actions to outgroups, but are also more exposed to political violence and perceive a greater threat to their physical safety.93
91. It is suggested that an important lesson of the Northern Ireland peace process is that engaging in talks with ‘terrorist’ groups is important as a means to transform a conflict away from violence.94
92. The effectiveness of community-based restorative justice schemes in Northern Ireland may be strongly mediated by the gender of participants.95
93. The conflict and its revolution may have affected broader social attitudes held by prominent individuals in the region, such as attitudes towards homosexuality.96
94. The approach taken to the British government to international terrorism threats abroad after September 11 2001, and terrorist threats in Northern Ireland, have been systematically different, if not contradictory.97
95. Interviews with nearly 100 community group leaders involved in EU-funded economic development programmes in Northern Ireland and the Border regions (the Peace II programme) suggested that most believed the funds had had a positive impact on the region in terms of cross-community contact and reconciliation; however there were concerns that the region should not become too dependent on such initiatives to maintain peace and further economic development.98
96. The role of the Irish diaspora, and in particular on Americans of Irish descent, on bringing international attention and support to peace-building in the region is important to consider.99
97. An important aspect of conflict resolution and negotiation in Northern Ireland has been the need to encourage groups to move beyond a zero-sum game mentality in the contestation of territory, and instead to think of space as a mutable resource, and to reach agreement on the minimum resources needed by each side.100
98. Counter-insurgency strategies practices in Northern Ireland during the conflict did not display great commitment to human rights, and because of this may have prolonged rather than shortened the conflict.101
99. Comparisons have been made between Northern Ireland and South Africa in regards to the role and opportunities for victims of political violence and oppression to tell their stories in informal and official forums, suggesting that unless victim accounts are given official recognition they can be marginalised and lack wide legitimacy.102
100. Former prisoners and combatants involved in paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland can be effective leaders in conflict transformation.103
101. There is evidence that greater intergroup forgiveness is associated with a smaller impact of victimhood on psychiatric morbidity.104
102. The conflict in Northern Ireland is included as one of many examples of an ‘ethnic challenge to government authority’, and included in an international database bearing this name. This database grouped conflict prevention measures into two broad categories – peaceful measures and coercive measures – each containing a number of subcategories. It found nearly 95% of measures (729/780) were peaceful, with a disproportionately high share of the coercive measures being applied in Northern Ireland.105
103. Suicide rates amongst the elderly in Northern Ireland tend to be lower than in other parts of the UK.106
104. It has been estimated that 3740 people have died directly as a result of the troubles between 1969 and 1999.107 Rates of completed suicides halved after 1969, supporting a long-standing hypothesis that homicide and suicide rates tend to be inversely related.107,108 Levels of psychiatric morbidity are not dissimilar in Northern Ireland to elsewhere in the UK.107
105. The non-elevated rates of reported psychiatric morbidity in Northern Ireland over a period of chronic sectarian strife has led to an interest in the development of psychological coping strategies amongst Northern Irish communities.109
106. The RUC was disbanded in 2001, and was often seen as biased against Catholics, meaning even the commemoration of officers killed in the RUC has been considered a political act.110
107. The built environment in Belfast city centre has changed rapidly in recent years, and efforts have been made to normalise both the physical geography and psycho-geography of this area.111
108. Outgroup trust has been found to be an important mediator of intergroup contact in Northern Ireland, more so than perceived outgroup ‘likeability’.112
109. In research on the perception of Polish migrants, Northern Irish Protestants were found to be less welcoming of migrants when the migrants’ Catholic religious identity was emphasised than when other attributes were emphasised.113
110. Commemoration and remembrance of the First World War differs substantially between Republicans and Loyalists in Northern Ireland.114
111. Debates are ongoing as to whether the Provisional IRA’s paramilitary campaign should be considered sectarian.115
112. Interviews with Catholic adolescents near the Northern Irish border found those living in Northern Ireland were keener to emphasise their ‘Irishness’ than those living in the Republic of Ireland.116
113. Secondary schools in Northern Ireland have been categorised as either segregated, mixed, or integrated, with pupils attending mixed and integrated schools tending to express more positive attitudes to intergroup mixing and contact more generally.117
114. There is some evidence that the beneficial effects of positive contact on inter-group attitudes may generalise beyond the most salient outgroup (the ‘primary outgroup’), reducing prejudice towards other outgroups as well, a phenomenon known as the ‘secondary transfer effect’. 118
115. Religion has been considered to possess a dual function for individuals, cementing individuals both in a social identity and providing a belief system with which important epistemic and ontological issues may be addressed with greater certainty. While these factors may help to increase wellbeing, it can also have negative individual and social impacts by fomenting intergroup conflict.119
116. The prominence of religious identity in sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland means religious agents need to be recognised as having an important role to play in conflict transformation. 120
117. It has been argued that religion relates to nationalism in Ireland by serving three distinct roles: operating as an ‘ethnic marker’; by providing a belief system; and by providing a social organisation, facilitating group solidarity.121
118. Consociational governments have their origins in the Dutch experience of managing ‘plural societies’, and based around four prescriptions for political process: grand coalition; proportional representation; mutal veto; and autonomy. It is argued that such arrangements are somewhat segregationalist rather than integrationalist by design.122
119. The re-invention of individuals, formerly active in paramilitary organisations and convicted of terrorist offenses, as non-state actors promoting peace in Northern Ireland raises a number of ethical concerns, and affords opportunity for the perpetuation and legitimation of terroristic narratives that helped initiate and perpetuate the conflict.123
120. Attempts to present a standard historical account of Northern Irish history in both Catholic and state schools have been underway since the early 1990s.124
121. Segregated schools appear to contribute to in-group bias and out-group prejudice amongst school children, with broader political ramifications.125
122. The setting up of a ‘Legacy Commission’ to record accounts from both sides of the conflict has been opposed by elite political and civil actors from both sides of the conflict.126
123. Ethnographic research into the use of space in Belfast city centre, since the GFA and subsequent economic development, has argued that peacebuilding has successfully generated ‘deterritorialised spaces’ within the city.127
124. A meta-analysis of over 500 studies on intergroup contact theory suggests that benefits of intergroup contact are found even when the four originally proposed conditions for optimal contact – equal status, common goals, no intergroup competition, and authority sanction – are not met; and that there tends to be generalisation of positive attitudes beyond the immediate outgroup in the members of the situation (the secondary transfer effect).128
125. The lack of effective military intelligence in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1975 is considered to have had a detrimental impact on security and violence reduction and containment in the region.129
126. Both closeness and frequency of outgroup contacts are found to affect intergroup relations, with closer out-group contacts (friends and family) associated with greater out-group trust than more distant out-group contacts (neighbours and work colleagues).130
127. A survey of Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland found that Catholic nationalists and residents of Belfast city were less likely to perceive physical separation of communities as negatively impacting the peace process than other respondents.131
128. Up to seven prior attempts at bringing peace to Northern Ireland were made between 1969 and the Belfast Agreement of 1998, including the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973. It has been argued that what made the Belfast successful was the presence of key individuals acting effectively as ‘brokers’ in the complex social networks which had to be negotiated at the time.132
129. A social psychological study on interpersonal interactions between Protestants and Catholics found that differences in micro-behaviours in a particular context – such as sitting next to a member from the outgroup – was not indicative of attitudes towards the outgroup overall.133
130. The term ‘competitive victimhood’ describes the phenomenon whereby members of groups involved in violent conflict seek to establish that their group has suffered more than the other group as a result of the conflict.134
131. There is evidence from a representative survey that Protestants/unionists tend to express higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, and more negative attitudes to immigrants and ethnic minorities, than do Catholic/nationalist communities. This has been attributed to differences in perceived ‘cultural threat’, defined as the sense that the out-group risks somehow obstructing or diluting in-group values, identity or traditions.135
132. The EU has been seen as important to conflict resolution and facilitating British-Irish cooperation in Northern Ireland.136
133. There may be diminishing marginal returns in the reduction of out-group prejudice as a function of the number of existing out-group contacts, with the first contacts having the greatest marginal reductions in prejudice.137
134. The lifetime prevalence of traumatic stress and exposure to traumatic events is high in Northern Ireland, with a representative survey of the Northern Irish finding over 60% of respondents had experienced a lifetime traumatic events, of which around two thirds were presumed to be conflict related, and men significantly more likely to experience such events than women.138 Around 46% of men and 56% of women how experienced a traumatic event experienced a mental disorder at some point on their lifetime, compared with 27% and 31% of those without traumatic event exposure.138
135. The political role played by murals in Northern Ireland may have reduced levels of street graffiti in the region overall compared with other regions in North America and Europe.139
136. The conflict is estimated to have reduced GDP per capita in Northern Ireland by up to 10%.140
137. Analysis of a database of more than a thousand individuals involved in PIRA found the members when committing their first identifiable PIRA-related activity was 25 years, the same age as Jihadi recruits in more recent conflicts.141 The average age of recruitment was around three years younger, and increased as the conflict progressed.141 As the average of recruits increased, violence decreased.141
138. Adolescents in family environments that experienced high conflict tended to have poorer educational outcomes.142
139. The benefits of intergroup contact for reducing out-group prejudice amongst school children has been found in all school types (segregated, mixed and integrated).143
140. The third phase of the EU programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland took place over the years 2007 to 2013. Community group leaders considered it largely successful at promoting cross-community contact and reconciliation, but bureaucratic.144
141. Amongst adolescents living in Belfast, exposure to both sectarian antisocial behaviour was associated with increased general and sectarian aggression within twelve months.145
142. The history and sensitivity of the conflict in Northern Ireland raises unique challenges for the teaching of citizenship classes in secondary schools in the region.146
143. The lack of a formal truth-recovery process to address historical injustices relating to the conflict means that the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland is sometimes used as a proxy for addressing the role of the state in the conflict, in addition to addressing individual injustices.147
144. Amongst children in integrated and segregated schools in Northern Ireland, cross-group friendships and extended out-group contact had somewhat different positive effects on intergroup relations, with the former leading to better intergroup relations through increased self-disclosure and outgroup empathy, and the latter leading to improved perceived peer norms towards the out-group.148
145. The linkage between religious, national and ethnic identity has been explored through examination of the ‘Ulster-Scots’ identity in Northern Ireland.149



[SESSION 01: END O’LEARY 1995; WORDS 672]

[SESSION 02: End Breen 2000; Words 1289]

[SESSION 03: End Niens 2005; words 2068]

[SESSION 04: End Wilson 2013; words 6586]

[Session 05: start w/ 2014: ]